Energy independence can be perilous in a country plagued by misunderstanding of the concept. In pursuit of energy independence, a country faces two hazards. One is the wasted expenditure of public money. The other is nonchalance when the goal seems within reach.
In its current political mood, the US government is strongly disinclined to spend money on "independence" associated with nonrenewable hydrocarbons. It prefers nowadays to waste money on the commercialization of uncompetitive energy with fatal problems of scale. A better strategy would be to focus public spending on research and to let markets set the fuel mix. But that transfer of economic control from politicians to citizens awaits further increases in the cost of electricity, degradation of delivery systems, and an inevitable reaction by voters against energy authoritarianism.
Hazard of nonchalance
The hazard of nonchalance is more immediate. Diminished reliance on imported oil creates the illusion that the US already has achieved or drawn near enough to energy independence to abandon longstanding concern about oil in trade. According to a different version of this hazard, energy independence and security represent trifling matters in comparison with the horrors of climate change. Both views are misguided.
The beginning of wisdom on energy independence is that the US is not energy-independent and will not be in any meaningful sense of the phrase. By the standard metric, net trade, the US is approaching independence for fossil energy. It's a net exporter of coal and soon will be for natural gas. Net imports of oil and gas liquids are falling. On that basis, the country can become a net energy exporter.
In matters of independence, however, the important commodity is oil-at least for the US. It's the potential for disruption of foreign oil supplies, vulnerable as they are to political disturbance, that makes energy independence a matter of special concern. And with oil, US progress is impressive, thanks largely to recently developed shale resources. According to the Energy Information Administration, net imports as a share of total US liquids consumption fell from 60% in 2005 to 24% in 2015. Still, EIA expects the US to remain a net liquids importer beyond 2040. Although the net-import share of total consumption will have dropped to 7% by that year, its lowest level since 1957, the US will depend on foreign sources for 1.5 million b/d of crude and other liquids.
Even if the US imported no oil, however, it would need to worry about oil in trade. The large loss of oil supply anywhere raises prices everywhere. No country involved in trade of any kind, net oil exporter or otherwise, is immune from the economic effects. So no country can claim independence from the global oil market.
The Middle East
For that reason, no globally influential country, regardless of its status in oil trade, can afford to disengage from the Middle East. While unconventional resources introduce great potential, the Middle East still dominates oil supply with its massive reserves and low production costs. And the region is changing rapidly-from the upsets of the Arab Spring, to the economic restructurings in Saudi Arabia and neighbors, to the geopolitical realignments in progress as endemic rivalries evolve and terrorism spreads. The US surrendered much influence when it opted for a subdued role in the region. Whether that was wise is open for debate. What cannot sensibly be argued is that a lowering of net oil imports diminishes US interests in Middle Eastern affairs.
Although energy independence calibrated to oil trade can be a misleading goal, movement toward it remains important. The domestic use of oil produced domestically keeps wealth created by resource development home. That's why a country should want to produce as much and import as little oil as it can. And it's why the supply dimensions of independence and security-even and especially those related to nonrenewable hydrocarbons-never must lose priority in the formulation of energy policy.