U.K. operators rebut safety criticism

WithDavid Knottfrom London
[email protected]

Early in December, the U.K. Offshore Operators Association (Ukooa) issued a press notice defending industry's recent safety record "in view of the expected publication...of a book criticizing the offshore safety regime developed as a result of Lord Cullen's report November 1990."

Getting the defense in before the attack takes place is a common ploy among politicians these days, but it carries the risk of drawing attention to potentially damaging criticism.

As a journalist, I was naturally intrigued by Ukooa's statement and tracked down a copy of the book, Paying for the Piper, published by Mansell Publishing Ltd., London, in mid-December.

The book's authors are: Charles Woolfson, senior lecturer in industrial relations, University of Glasgow; John Foster, professor of applied social studies, University of Paisley; and Matthias Beck, lecturer in economics, University of St. Andrews.

The Piper in the title is Piper Alpha platform, which blew up in 1988, killing 167 workers. Lord Cullen headed a public inquiry into the blast, and his report formed the basis of a new U.K. offshore safety regime (OGJ, Feb. 14, 1994, p. 25).

Accusations

The authors accept that the Cullen report profoundly modified management practice.

While trades unions' input to safety concerns was marginalized, they said, management was given full command of safety processes.

Regarding the industry's post-Cullen creation of a new safety culture, the authors wrote, "In terms of any long-term effectiveness in reducing accidents, very considerable doubts remain.

"This is precisely because its definition of culture is manifestly artificial, and real-life communication is considerably more complex than what is presumed."

The authors base this comment on evidence of which different groups of offshore workers had the greatest survival rates during the Piper Alpha blast.

Communication fear

They cite research showing that closely integrated groups such as divers, which had their own informal safety routines and largely ignored official procedures during the emergency, mainly survived.

Other groups, said the authors, largely perished because they followed instructions to make their way to the galley accommodation, where they obediently waited for instructions that never came.

"People's position within a social hierarchy affects the way they listen to others and what they say," the authors wrote.

They argue that heightened job insecurity in recent years prevents workers from openly discussing safety problems with management.

Ukooa points out that each offshore installation has a safety committee consisting of safety representatives elected by workers.

The representatives are trained, said Ukooa, and a recent report concluded that the system is working well, although representatives needed more training in communication.

As to whether the safety regime has improved, Ukooa lets statistics talk, citing "a 48% reduction in injury frequency between 1988-89 and 1994-95."