Successful alliances driven by processes, not discounts

Sept. 23, 1996
J. Ford Brett, Valerie B. Craig, Kathryne E. Pile, David B. Wadsworth, Kathryn V. Brett OGCI Management Tulsa John Aslakson Gas Research Institute Chicago When alliances are executed properly and partners have a full understanding of true integration, drilling ventures can improve their potential to reduce costs and accelerate production by 12-30%.

J. Ford Brett, Valerie B. Craig, Kathryne E. Pile, David B. Wadsworth, Kathryn V. Brett
OGCI Management
Tulsa

John Aslakson
Gas Research Institute
Chicago

When alliances are executed properly and partners have a full understanding of true integration, drilling ventures can improve their potential to reduce costs and accelerate production by 12-30%.

Many companies enter alliances without a full grasp of the economic potential such a relationship might offer. Many alliances rely too heavily on relationship issues and commercial terms instead of focusing on integrating their technical processes successfully.

Process-driven alliance (PDA) is the term adopted by a new Gas Research Institute report prepared by OGCI Management Inc. to represent a fundamentally different way to plan, execute, and evaluate drilling projects.1 The term sounds academic but is not.

Not to be confused with the current industry understanding of the term alliance, PDA is much more than a change in commercial terms between organizations. Instead, process-driven alliances are the result of two or more parties that enter into an agreement with a common set of objectives which, through joint planning, execution, and evaluation, provide economic benefits to all concerned-often without regard for corporate boundaries.

The starting point for this report was GRI's Successful Drilling Practices studies (OGJ, Sept. 25, 1995, pp. 68-74), which find the most successful drilling methods in specific gas drilling regions.

In the Greater Green River basin study, 5 years of drilling performance data from every operator in the Moxa Arch were analyzed.2 All organizations improved at a fairly steady rate except for one major operator, which significantly increased its performance by integrating its technical processes. This improvement made formerly uneconomic plays profitable.

The data clearly demonstrated that of the 30% of reduced drilling costs, 39% of the reduction resulted directly from many small improvements attributable to the alliance and planning. The major operator credited this dramatic improvement to integrating technical processes among the alliance partners.

Findings

The interviews in the PDA study revealed great variance in the way companies measure-or do not measure-their projects' success. This lack of quantified value restricted OGCI's ability to make quantitative or statistical comparisons of success between organizations. Even with a lack of quantifiable values, the analysis revealed some new findings:

  • Process-driven alliances add demonstrable real value by reducing costs and accelerating production. PDAs can also add stability if this real value is shared among all the partners.

  • Good working relationships improve, but do not form, the foundation of successful drilling alliances.

  • Seven factors contribute to successful alliances. Documented successes range from 12 to 30%. Nevertheless, a few conditions exist that can reduce the impact of even the most well-planned relationship.

  • Independent operators naturally use some elements of PDAs because of their size. The scope of independents' projects is sometimes too limited to take full advantage of a PDA.

PDAs create stability

The long-term viability of any drilling relationship hinges on its ability to create real value and achieve stability.

The operator can benefit by discounted prices, and the supplier can benefit from long-term contracts. Reshuffling responsibilities or signing long-term contracts alone does not necessarily add any real, substantive value.

Without improvement in the drilling process, however, the industry as a whole is no richer. This is much like dividing up a pie. Sometimes with a conventional alliance, the partners merely change the size of the slices of the pie. But slicing the pie differently does not create more pie, i.e., more value. Only increasing the size of the pie creates additional value.

Of the four findings in this study, the most central is that process definition and linking add demonstrable real value by reducing costs and accelerating production. In other words, the most effective way to form an alliance is through a detailed description and improvement of the technical processes involved. The organizations in the process-driven alliance are linked together with a common set of technical processes, mutually defined bottom-line goals, and shared benefits.

Improving the technical process, not segregating individual companies' contributions, is the focus of the relationship.

To continue to succeed, the alliance must also be stable. All members must have incentives to remain in the relationship. If one party's profitability suffers as the result of the relationship, then the agreement will be unstable. Without stability, what appears to be an improvement may actually be only a shifting of profit from one partner to another.

Stability of any system or process must be defined in relation to disturbances. For example, a golf ball can theoretically rest on top a bowling ball, but it is not stable. At the slightest disturbance, it will roll off. Similarly, an alliance might add real value; however, if the partners find more profitable uses for their management time and effort, best equipment, and top personnel, then the alliance will eventually fail. An alliance is stable if the other commercial options available to the parties involved are less attractive than the alliance relationship.

Value chain

Creating real value through linked technical processes can be described as a value chain. The operating partners' roles are integrated into the chain via a process description. Fig. 1 [20067 bytes], Fig. 2 [24194 bytes], Fig. 3 [25589 bytes], Fig. 4 [26947 bytes], Fig. 5 [23776 bytes], Fig. 6 [22670 bytes], Fig. 7 [28855 bytes] build a graphical representation of where real value is generated in any drilling alliance, illustrate the value chain theory, and demonstrate the concepts of real value and stability.

Fig. 1 shows the cash flow schematic for an operator's project. Assuming a well will achieve a given productivity (i.e., focusing only on the contribution of drilling costs to the bottom line), an operator can improve its profit picture by reducing expenses (Fig. 2 [24194 bytes]).

As shown in Fig. 3 [25589 bytes], the profit of the service companies, tangibles suppliers, and drilling contractor is similarly dependent upon each company's ability to increase revenue and decrease expenses. Their ability to reduce expenses depends on their ability to increase utilization of equipment and personnel and to reduce waste and loss. Fig. 4 [26947 bytes] illustrates that if expenses are relatively constant, increasing or maintaining profit depends on the terms of the operating contracts and on the ability to attract customers.

Thus, operator and supply/service company profit motives can be on a collision course (Fig. 5 [23776 bytes]). On a short-term basis, the suppliers and the operator are inherently at cross purposes. Operators would rather have equivalent service at a low price, and suppliers would rather have higher prices. In fact, viewed in this way the relationship is a zero-sum game: if one party wins, the other loses. This tension explains the source of the adversarial relationship between operator and supplier/contractor that can sometimes characterize conventional drilling business arrangements.

The GRI study found that about 50% of the alliances studied are driven by the structure of the commercial terms-not the technical processes. None of the commercial structure-driven alliances were able to demonstrate quantified improvements in performance.

The percentage shows that simply putting partners together does not address the fundamental issues of creating real value and achieving stability. Focusing solely on commercial terms is essentially cutting the same pie differently. The study showed that the goal of the most successful alliances was not to craft commercial relationships between the parties, but to create real value.

Real value is created only if supplier expenses are reduced or if the operator's revenue is increased, either by increased or accelerated production (Fig. 6 [22670 bytes]). For an alliance to create real value, it must increase the size of the pie. For a drilling alliance, this means either creating more value from the resource, creating the value at a reduced cost to society, or both.

The most successful alliances understand how joint process improvements reduce total system expense and cycle time required to bring new production on line, thereby increasing the net present value of the revenue stream. This can only happen with a detailed understanding of how technology can be applied to achieve these process improvements.

This real value is rarely created through a large breakthrough improvement. Usually real value is created through working within the technical and planning process to identify a large number of small efficiency improvements.

Creating value is not enough if the relationship is unstable. If the operator reduces expenses by improving the joint processes but does not share rewards with the suppliers and service companies for their increased efficiency, then the suppliers and service companies will see reduced profitability as the reward for their increased efficiency. Any service provider whose fee is based on time will make less per well as efficiency increases. Such relationships will be stable only if the service provider has no other, more attractive choices for work.

As one operator of a successful alliance related to the GRI team, "All partners must agree that an alliance is not a discount. Instead, they must recognize that the partners will make greater profits through incentives by reducing the operator's costs."

For a stable relationship, increased efficiency must be in every player's self-interest. This sometimes means that the benefits of the value generated should be shared with suppliers or the relationship will be unstable (Fig. 7 [28855 bytes]).

Alliances have the potential to create real value and stability. The only way for a structural change (alliance) to add real value is to reduce waste and loss in the system. Reducing suppliers by granting long-term contracts does not necessarily improve total system efficiency; the only reliable way to add real value is to integrate technical processes. Also, successful PDAs distribute additional profits among all partners. Without benefit sharing, the relationship lacks stability.

Integrating technical processes is the key that is missing in most alliances today. By fully understanding and implementing the full view of PDA, petroleum alliances can embrace real value and stability in their ventures.

Successful PDAs

The findings of this study show that the integrated processes of successful alliances drive their relationships. This integration includes clearly and concisely defining the process, accurately and realistically quantifying each process component, identifying and prioritizing improvement opportunities, and jointly operating to achieve maximum results for the process. In addition, successful alliances analyze their processes in an ongoing manner, building feedback and improvement into the process maps.

Seven factors were discovered to be essential when creating successful process-driven alliances (see box). Table 1 [58809 bytes] demonstrates which of these factors were incorporated into each of the 17 alliances (which are identified by letters) studied. Interestingly, most of the alliances included two or more of these factors, leading to the conclusion that the tools and principles commonly associated with continuous process improvement have spread throughout the drilling industry.

Only 5 of the 17 alliances studied quantified the results of their alliances in any meaningful way. One major service company noted of a failed alliance, "We were never able to get our arms around how profitable we were for our operator. If they did have numbers, they never shared them with us. We had no documentation to prove our value and the value of the alliance."

Lack of performance evaluation complicated the task of correlating between an alliance's characteristics and its success.

For the study, levels of success were assigned based on interviews held with the partners within each alliance. This provided a method of relating the success factors to the "reported" success of each relationship. Those alliances that incorporated at least five of the success factors had a much higher chance of achieving what all parties considered to be success (Table 2 [45229 bytes]).

The strongest evidence of the power of PDAs is in the results of the five documented successful alliances. All five did the following:

  • Incorporated goals linked to profitability

  • Had a well-defined process

  • Used quantitative performance measurement tools.

The documented improvements for these alliances ranged from 12 to 30% of total drilling-related costs.

Fig. 8 [27796 bytes] shows that alliances whose goal is to create real value through PDA improvements are far more likely to capture the maximum savings available through their operating relationships.

Changed commercial terms

Many of the drilling organizations interviewed contend that relationships are the critical success factor of an alliance. Typical quotes from the literature are, "The success of this alliance is based largely on trust, planning, and communication," and "The success of an alliance is based largely on mutual trust, constant communication, and the ability to work as a team."3 4 One operator interviewed for the study stated, "Relationships are the key to alliances."

The study concludes that this information is incomplete. Although relationships definitely contribute to success, improved working relationships alone are not a reliable way to add real value or stability to drilling programs. If technical process improvement is lacking, the success of alliances based on relationships is temporary. If partners cannot demonstrate the real value added to or stability created by an alliance, the alliance's continued existence is hard to justify.

This finding relates directly to the difficulty of quantifying the success of relationships. Team members may feel that morale is strong and that customer service has improved. Champions or advocates may be built into the system, but relationships are hard to measure. The partners cannot clearly identify the amount of improvement-if any-as a result of the alliance

A related issue is commercial terms. Without clearly defined, measured technical processes, organizations have no way to judge whether alliances improve the bottom line or are just a different way of working together.

The same applies to changing the conventional bidding process. Simply changing commercial terms or shifting the burden of cost and responsibility onto suppliers may provide temporary cost reductions to the operator. In the long run, though, it does not necessarily generate real value.

Conventional alliances fall short in several ways:

  • They concentrate on managing people, not processes. Total system waste and loss may not be reduced.

  • They are only as stable as the individuals involved; when key individuals leave, the alliances often fail. Even when the alliances are successful, their success cannot be reliably duplicated.

  • They are often unstable because the mutual benefit of the relationship is unclear.

How can an alliance reliably create real value and a stable, long-term relationship? What is missing?

The missing factor is that the alliances are not driven by their processes. Although the partners may change commercial terms, shift responsibility to a supplier or contractor, or reduce the supplier base, these moves do not necessarily reduce total cost. By contrast, PDA partners accept common objectives and integrate their technical processes to provide economic benefits to all parties.

This relationship makes the most of the strengths each partner offers. The best person for any given task performs that task as efficiently as possible. Redundant or low-value tasks are eliminated, or the process is changed altogether to become more efficient. All parties benefit economically, usually through incentives, so they are financially motivated to find the best solutions.

Characteristics of failure

Integrating technical processes is the key to alliance success. However, process-driven alliances can fail if certain situations occur-notably, if the project scope is too small, if too many partners are involved in the alliance, if the process is not revised or changed over time, and if a clear exit strategy has not been developed.

  • Project scope too small. Alliances are most effective on projects of sufficient scope: either a great number of wells in one area (generally at least 25) with less per-well return or a smaller number with potentially high per-well return.

    Time is a factor, too. Noted a service company representative, "Partners need a lock-in, long-term agreement of at least 2 years; otherwise, the operator holds all the advantage."

    Alliances for projects of a smaller scope seldom had the necessary time or funding to justify start-up expenses: approximately $150,000, according to the interviews, to account for employee time for process-mapping, partner selection, performance measurement criteria identification, and negotiations. They also do not allow enough time to recoup facilities and personnel costs such as bringing a service company on site or reorganizing the company.

    "There is a high cost of entry into an alliance and a high cost of exit as well," stated a service company employee.

    Hand-in-hand with this is management's perspective of an alliance's successes or failures. When an alliance is viewed as a well-by-well operation, the project is often doomed. "Alliances are encouraged, but short-term failures aren't being permitted. The result is watered-down, ineffective alliances," noted an engineer for a major operator.

  • Too many partners. How many partners should an alliance include? Some alliances believe more is better-that involving all members of an operation improves the process and increases cost savings. However, the ideal is the minimum number of partners needed to account for 80% of total costs, usually four to six.

    Too many partners can increase alliance administrative costs and create an imbalance of power, i.e., partners which account for 1% of costs should not have the same "say" as partners which account for 60% of costs.

    Sometimes companies "tag along" after a sister company that is already a partner. These subsidiaries can be effective or weak. The problem arises when they are invited only because of their affiliation or because of a national "alliance" (for example, a pricing agreement), not because of their regional experience or ability. In every case, each partner must be judged on its own merit, and partners should be limited to those that generate the greatest percentage of costs.

  • Changes not incorporated. Another reason alliances fail is because they do not incorporate changes over time. Process mapping is strongly encouraged and funded at the beginning of a project. However, the attention to this exercise wanes as the length of a project increases. The result is that improvements level off and may even drop. There is no longer a push for process enhancements nor for capturing information.

    This happens often when a company takes a short-term view of the project's scope. Process improvement meetings may be curtailed temporarily because of time and budget restraints. Or perhaps the alliance team ineffectively communicates the value that process mapping meetings add to the economics of the project.

    This strong need for continued process mapping is acknowledged by an oil industry alliance coordinator, "Once a company's processes are mapped, then changes to the process can be identified that will best support the alliance. In addition, after an alliance has operated for a certain period, formal process mapping should again occur to identify further opportunities for improvement. Formal mapping is a very enlightening activity. It brings to the surface a lot of dying dinosaurs."

  • No clear exit strategy. "At some point, technology and application will become optimized. After that point, some train wrecks are going to happen. You need to identify this point and prepare for it," said a major service company representative.

    Business is a "living" entity with its own cycle of birth, growth, maturity, and death. Alliances are not immune to this cycle. Even if all reasons for failure are accounted for and prevented, a successful alliance will eventually reach a point of maturation and death. If no thought or provision has been made for an exit strategy, the alliance partners can lose the benefits and real value they have accrued.

    An exit strategy is a process to end the alliance while it is still operating in a positive mode. This relates back to well-defined goals and appropriate incentives. Projects naturally come to an end-usually because a field is fully developed. When the alliance reaches this natural winding-down point, it needs a procedure to end the project cleanly or to transition to a new field or project. Otherwise, the alliance can drag on and result in financial losses or unattainable benchmarks.

    The frustration experienced beyond this point can result in formation damage or can leave the partners feeling bitter and disillusioned.

    A formal exit strategy defines its technical limit-the point at which the project reaches its peak in profit potential for all the partners. It also explores ways in which the trust and relationships which result from a successful alliance can be used for other projects-once again with a goal of profitability for all partners.

    Independents

    A premise going into this study was that major and independent operators run on essentially parallel tracks. The hypothesis was that independents are smaller versions of majors, possibly incorporating alliance principles more effectively because their size requires that they find innovative ways to remain profitable in the industry.

    Independents are indeed involved in alliances. Noted one independent operator, "Alliances are the only way to go. Competition the way it's being used now is harmful to everyone in the industry." Another independent operator said, "[Because of alliances] we've been able to try out new techniques at a fraction of the cost."

    The interviews of independents further revealed that the costs of a process-driven alliance may outweigh the benefits because of the limited scope of most projects. Independent operators often lack the resources (time, money, and staff) to capture learning and improve their processes.

    Noted an employee from one independent, "For alliances to succeed, they need ample resources and priority-setting. Unfortunately, independents trail majors in these areas. That's probably why independents aren't as involved in creating alliances as majors are."

    Independents often find themselves in one or two well rather than large multiwell operations. Because of the smaller scope of operations, independents are unable to amass the knowledge necessary to improve in a specific play unless they share their knowledge with other independents.

    One interesting observation about independents came from a drilling contractor, who said, "Independents probably can't significantly improve their operations through alliances. It's like comparing Southwest Airlines with American Airlines. American (the majors) would like to be like Southwest (the independents). But they can't do it because they'd have to completely scrap everything they are and start over as an entirely new entity. On the other hand, alliances are great for majors; that's the best route for them to take to approach the 'Southwest style.'"

    Independents will probably have much more modest gains from implementing PDAs as outlined here. The trend may well be toward adopting a philosophy like that of Union Pacific Resources Corp., which is run more like a manufacturer than a natural-resources company.5

    The bottom line

    Current gas drilling alliances sometimes do not recognize their fullest potential because they lack the fundamental requirements characteristic of a solid business venture: real value, stability, and measurable success.

    Companies enter into alliances without a full grasp of the economic potential-or lack of it-that such a relationship might offer. This happens because most alliances rely too much on relational issues and commercial terms.

    Rather than relying solely on these factors, companies need to focus on integrating their technical processes successfully. As a byproduct of the success factors inherent in PDAs (defined goals linked to profitability, well-defined processes with buy-in at appropriate levels, quantitative performance measurement tools and performance-based incentives, and process improvement analysis) relational issues also improve.

    Integrating technical processes is the key that is missing in most alliances today. Alliances that practice the skills characteristic of PDAs (especially goals linked to profitability, a well-defined process, and performance tools) have experienced its benefits. By fully understanding and implementing the fullest view of PDA and by incorporating measurable factors for success, petroleum alliances can finally embrace real value and stability in their ventures.

    References

    1. Brett, J.F., et al., "Technical Process Integration: The Key to Building Successful Drilling Alliances," Gas Research Institute, 1996.

    2. Brett, J.F., and Gregoli, M.K., "Successful Drilling Practices Study: Greater Green River Basin," Gas Research Institute, 1995.

    3. Barnette, J.C., and Spearman, J.W., "Service Companies' Perspective of Strategic Alliancing in Alaska," proceedings from the 64th Annual Society of Petroleum Engineers West Regional Meeting, Long Beach, Calif., Mar. 23-25, 1994.

    4. Phillips, C.J., et al., "Strategic Alliances in the Wireline Services Industry," proceedings from the International Association of Drilling Contractors/Society of Petroleum Engineers Drilling Conference, Dallas, February 1994.

    5. Fritsch, P., "Home Alone: A Union Pacific Unit Prospers by Drilling Lots of Domestic Wells," The Wall Street Journal, Jan. 23, 1996, A8.

    SEVEN CRITICAL SUCCESS FACTORS

    Mutual goals

    All partners must have clearly defined, mutual goals to ensure they understand what each party wants and requires from the relationship.

    Goals linked to profitability

    In addition to being defined, goals must be tied to profitability. If the venture will not be profitable to all partners, it should be redesigned.

    Well-defined process

    Expanding the project's goals to include all steps required in the drilling process is the function of process mapping. This stage requires enough detail to ensure all redundancies are eliminated from the process, improving profitability. All partners must work together in this exercise from the onset. In addition, the partners need to step outside the "box" of traditional roles and permit room for unconventional assignments.

    Buy-in at appropriate levels

    Approval must be obtained from each partner's senior management, but buy-in ranges from the board room down to the field hands and truck drivers. Buy-in means more than informing employees; it includes soliciting their ideas and helping them adapt to the new corporate culture.

    Quantitative performance measurement tools

    A possible downfall of relationship-driven alliances is that people skills are subjective and difficult to measure. Quantitative, performance-related tools are needed to measure the success of the achievements against the goals established at the onset of the project.

    Performance-based incentives

    An important success factor is detailing the incentives to be awarded to the partners and the benchmarks to which those incentives are tied.

    Process improvement analysis

    Successful alliances build in methods to analyze or scorecard performance throughout the process. This includes ensuring that analysis is tied to the original goals, learning through continuous improvement and documenting the knowledge, maintaining a proactive rather than a reactive posture, and focusing on the process instead of personality issues. Numerous feedback loops are built into the process to enhance communications and help retain learning. This is a critical aspect of an alliance: the ability to rework an alliance when technical changes occur.

    The Authors

    J. Ford Brett is president of OGCI Management in Tulsa. He was instrumental in developing OGCI's Organizational Learning Systems tool. He has led development teams to create training programs for drilling and exploration management.

    John Aslakson is principal project manager of GRI's drilling and completion technology group. He is responsible for research aimed at developing and testing new technologies to reduce the cost of drilling and equipping gas wells.

    Valerie B. Craig is project leader for OGCI's process driven alliance project for GRI. She has broad range of business and oil and gas experience. Craig worked for a major oil company as a financial/business analyst. Craig has an MBA from the University of Texas at Austin.

    Kathryne E. Pile has nearly 20 years of experience in technical writing and analysis in the fields of energy, computers, business, and health care practice management. She has coauthored two books in the petroleum industry and helped authors prepare more than 200 titles during her years as editorial director of PennWell Books.

    David B. Wadsworth has project leadership and technical experience in programming and computer model development. He has been responsible for the development and implementation of technical process models and other simulation programs. Wadsworth formerly worked for OGCI Management and is currently employed by Lockheed Martin Engineering & Sciences Co. in Houston.

    Kathryn V. Brett has a BA from Duke University with a dual focus in economics and energy policy. Her experience at SRI International involved the technical/economic evaluation of traditional and alternative energy sources.

    Copyright 1996 Oil & Gas Journal. All Rights Reserved.